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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to grant the 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an 
improper parole search? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's 
motion to exclude cummulative other crimes evidence? 
3. Did the trial court err by giving the jury an 
instruction which contained a mandatory rebuttable presumption? 
IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
PATRICK D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20814 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Patrick D. 
Johnson for Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Forgery, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as 
amended). A jury found him guilty following a trial on May 29-30, 
1985 in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, 
presiding. He was sentenced to the indeterminate terms of not 
more than five years for Burglary, and one to fifteen years for 
the Forgery, the sentences to run consecutively at the Utah State 
Prison beginning July 1, 198 5. 
Statement of Facts 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed three motions: 
1) a motion to sever seven counts of forgery from one count of 
burglary and one count of forgery alleged in the information; 
2) a motion to suppress evidence obtained during an improper 
parole search of the defendant's residence; and 3) a motion to 
exclude from trial the other crimes testimony of one cf the 
State's witnesses (R.10,13,25)• (Addendum A) The court granted 
the first motion but denied the other two (R.10,26,144,164). 
(Addendum B) 
During trial, and at•the hearing on the motion to suppress, 
the following facts were adduced. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on 
February 2, 1985 Harry Deckert, Pastor of the Four Square Church 
located at 1068 Jefferson Street, discovered that his church had 
been broken into and that a tape recorder was missing from the 
premises (T.14-19). On further investigation, Pastor Decket found 
what appeared to be blood stains on two shattered windows, on the 
floor of the church and on the door handle of the church's main 
door (T.18). It was stipulated at trial that police officer Tom 
Olsen responded to Mr. Deckert's report of the burglary; Officer 
Olsen investigated the scene and concluded that none of the sur-
faces inside or outside the church could be processed for finger-
prints (T.27). No blood samples were taken into evidence (T.27). 
No one was seen in or around the church by either Pastor Deckert 
or Officer Olsen (T.17). 
After the police investigation, Pastor Deckert found that 
two groups of checks were missing from two different Four Square 
Church checkbooks kept in his office desk (T.19). Thirty-five 
checks, numbered 1175-1210, were missing from the "light-blue" 
church checking account, and 86 checks, numbered 2444-2530, were 
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missing from the other set of checks colored "yellow" (T.19). 
Two Statefs exhibits S-l (a blue Four Square Church check, No. 
1180) and S-10 (a yellow church check, No. 2246[sic]) were 
identified by Mr. Deckert as two of the missing checks; Pastor 
Deckert testified that he had not issued the checks and that he 
had not given anyone authority to handle or issue the checks on 
behalf of Four Square Church (T.21). Pastor Deckert further 
testified that he did not know anyone named Cary Montoya or 
Gary G. Montoya (T.21). 
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on February 2, 1985, Four 
Square Church check No. 1180 was cashed at Macey1s supermarket 
located on 1406 West 10th North. Lynn Cevering, a Maceyfs employee, 
testified that he cashed the check for a black male who represented 
himself as Cary Montoya (T.32). According to Mr. Cevering, the 
individual claiming to be Cary Montoya presented two forms of 
identification—neither I.D. displayed a picture—and endorsed the 
check in Mr. Ceveringfs presence (T.31). On February 12th a police 
detective showed Mr. Cevering a photo spread containing five or six 
pictures and asked him to pick out the individual who had endorsed 
the Four Square Church check (T.33). Mr. Cevering selected the 
appellant's Patrick Johnson's, picture and wrote on the back of it 
that he was "70 percent" certain this was the individual who had 
endorsed check No. 1180 (T.35). However, on April 29, at a 
physical lineup which took place at the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice, Mr. Cevering was unable to identify Patrick Johnson as 
the individual who had claimed to be Cary Montoya back on 
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February 2 (T.37). In fact, Mr. Cevering indicated on his lineup 
instruction card that he "felt" someone other than the defendant 
was posibly the individual who had endorsed the check (T.37-38). 
Over defense counsel's numerous objections (including 
the denied 404(b) motion to exclude other crimes evidence), Nora 
Welch testified for the State. Ms. Welch, an employee at Stimsonfs 
supermarket located at 158 West 600 North, stated that she 
accepted a check for groceries and cash written on the account 
of Cary Montoya on February 2nd around 4:00 p.m. (T.46-49). She 
testified that she had cashed checks for the individual purporting 
to be Cary Montoya on more than one occasion (T.50). On February 
11th, Ms. Welch was shown a photo spread by a police detective 
and she positively identified the defendant as being the individual 
who cashed the Cary Montoya check (T.52-53). On March 5th, Ms. 
Welch selected the appellant from an eight-man lineup at the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, again, as being the individual who 
cashed the Cary Montoya check (T.55). Ms. Welch also testified 
that she told a police officer, sometime after February 2nd but 
before February 11th, that the individual who presented himself 
as Cary Montoya on February 2nd had a "mustache and a little 
beard" (T.62). In neither the photos, nor in the lineup did the 
defendant have a mustache and little beard. 
Cary Montoya testified at trial that he had not signed 
the February 2nd check, that he had given no one the authority 
to do so and that the last time he had seen his checkbook on 
November 17, 1984, it was in the hands of his landlady (T.64-67). 
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In November of 1984 Mr, Montoya's landlady evicted him; she 
claimed she would turn his checkbook over to his bank but she 
apparently never did (T.66). 
At trial, police crime lab technician, Steve Rowley, 
made a detailed comparison of the endorsement on the Four Square 
Church check and the signature on the check from the account of 
Gary Montoya (T.82-98). Mr. Rowley stated he was 90-95 per cent 
sure the two checks had been signed by the same person (T.98). 
Salt Lake Detective Kyle Jones testified that he met 
with the appellant's two parole officers, John Shepard and Rick 
Acevedo, on February 13, 198 5 and informed them that he had 
obtained a warrant for the arrest of Patrick Johnson for eight 
counts of forgery (R.181). Detective Jones told Mr. Shepard 
and Mr. Acevedo that the forgeries involved the Four Square 
Church and Cary Montoya checking accounts (T.197). Agents Acevedo 
and Shepard decided, based on this information and on the suspicion 
that the defendant had pawned a stereo on January 9th, that Mr. 
Shepard should conduct, a parole search of appellant's premises 
(R.192). 
On February 14, 1985 the appellant was residing with his 
mother, Connie Morashita, at 1861 West 600 North (T.69). John 
Shepard testified at trial, and at the pretrial hearing on the 
defense's motion to suppress, that he went to the appellant's 
residence around 2:00 p.m. on February 14th accompanied by Salt 
Lake City Detectives Kyle Jones and Jim Bell, Sargeant Mike 
Roberts and Lieutenant Brent Davis (T.69)(R.183). Mr. Shepard 
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stared that the police went to the residence to arrest the appel-
lant for forgery and that he (Mr. Shepard) went to the appellant's 
residence to conduct a parole search based on reasonable 
suspicion that the appellant had violated the terms of his parole 
(R.192). The record does not clearly indicate whether the police 
asked Mr. Shepard to accompany them to the residence (R.206,210). 
Once Agent Shepard and the police had arrived at the appellant's 
residence they remained out of sight while Agent Acevedo phoned 
the appellant to make sure he was in the apartment; Mr. Acevedo 
then radioed the police and informed them that the appellant was 
at home (R.206). After the four officers and Agent Shepard had 
gained entrance to Mrs. Morashita's apartment—with her consent— 
the police placed the appellant under arrest (R.203). Mr. 
Shepard then conducted a parole search of the apartment (R.208). 
It is unclear whether Mrs. Morishita gave permission for such 
a search. She testified she did not (R.213). 
Agent Shepard testified that he was specifically searching 
for Four Square Church checks (R.16) and that this is what he 
told Mrs. Morashita when he purportedly gained her consent to 
search (R.208). 
Mr. Shepard found a black binder in the apartment's 
front hall closet. He immediately confiscated the binder and 
its contents, terminated his parole search and turned the material 
over to the police while still inside the apartment (R.187-189). 
The binder contained: a Four Square Church check, a VISA credit 
card receipt signed "Cary Montoya," a VISA credit card receipt 
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to the Pawn Shop signed "Gary Montoya," a VISA credit card 
receipt to Thrifty Drugs signed "Cary Montoya,11 a Traveler's 
Express Purchase receipt signed "Willie Johnson," three photo-
graphs of the appellant and a photograph of another man—not 
the appellant (T.71-81). 
Connie Morashita's stipulated testimony indicated that 
her other son, Lonnie Johnson, was also living with her at the 
time of the appellant's arrest (T.127). 
On the last day of trial, defense counsel took exception 
to the court's decision to give the jury a possession of recently 
stolen property instruction (T.124). The jury convicted the 
appellant of che offenses of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony 
(based on the application of Utah's property recently stolen 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402 (1953 as amended), and Forgery, 
a Second Degree Felony (T.130). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument on appeal is that the trial erred in 
failing to suppress evidence obtained during an illegal parole 
search of the appellant's residence. The parole search conducted 
by John Shepard, the appellant's parole officer, was instigated 
by the police. Furthermore, the searcn was not conducted pursuant 
to Mr. Shepard's duties as a parole agent, but was carried out 
for the primary purpose of uncovering evidence with which to 
secure burglary and forgery convictions against the appellant. 
The second argument on appeal is that the court below 
committed reversible error by failing to exclude other crimes 
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evidence which was not probative on any issue at trial. After 
granting the appellant's motion to sever various counts of 
forgery, the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning 
one of the severed counts into trial. These graveLy inconsistent 
rulings permitted the State to present the jury with nothing more 
than cumulative evidence of the appellant's propensity to commit 
crime. 
The third argument on appeal is that the trial court com-
mitted a fundamental error when it read the jury an unconstitutional 
"possession of property recently stolen" instruction. Because 
this instruction contained a mandatory rebuttable presumption, 
it relieved the State of its burden of proof. The instruction 
severely abridged the appellant's right to be presummed innocent 
until proven guilty. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING AN IMPROPER 
PAROLE SEARCH. 
On the day prior to Patrick Johnson's arrest on eight 
counts of forgery, Detective Kyle Jones met with the appellant's 
parole officers, John Shepard and Rick Acevedo (R.181). Detective 
Jones informed the two officers of his intent to arrest the 
appellant (R.18). He fully explained the basis for the issuance 
of a warrant for the appellant's arrest (R.197), and he indicated 
his belief that certain stolen checks were probably still in the 
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appellantfs possession (R.181). After this meeting, Agents 
Shepard and Acevedo decided that one of them should accompany 
the arresting police officers to the appellant's residence in 
order to determine the nature and extent of Mr. Johnson's parole 
violation (R.192). 
On the day of the appellantfs arrest, Mr. Shepard and 
four police officers gained entry to the appellant!s motherfs 
(Mrs. Morashita's) apartment—where the appellant was residing— 
via Mrs. Morashitafs consent (R.208). After the appellant was 
arrrested, Mr. Shepard conducted a search of the apartment (R.208;. 
In one of the apartmentfs closets Agent Shepard found a black 
binder containing a Four Square Church check and numerous receipts 
bearing the signature "Cary Montoya" (R.187). Mr. Shepard immedi-
ately turned over the binder and its contents to the officers 
present in the apartment and terminated his search (R.187-189). 
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained during Agent Shepardfs parole search (R.13). 
(Addendum A) The appellant argued to the court below that the 
parole search was not conducted pursuant to Mr. Shepard's proper 
duties as a parole officer (R.55-56). It was, and is, the 
appellant's contention that the parole search was carried out for 
the purpose of uncovering evidence with which to secure burglary 
and forgery convictions against the appellant (R.56). The court 
below denied the motion to suppress (R.237-241). (Addendum B) 
In doing so, the court reasoned: 
The state must persuade this court. . . 
that the search was reasonably related 
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to the parole officer's duty. And I 
believe this is the point that is 
pressed by counsel for the defendant. 
She would argue that becuase it was 
obvious that the defendant would al-
ready be taken into custody that 
there was no further need for the 
parole officer to be involved to 
see whether or not the defendant 
had committed a crime or violated 
his parole. 
Court is not persuaded by that argu-
ment as the court feels that there 
are two independent and unrelated 
processes which begin. One is not 
controlled by the other. When a person 
is on parole that parole officer may 
investigate independently of officers, 
and despite what investigation they 
may be doing on new offenses, whether, 
in fact, he has broken the parole 
agreement. It is this court's duty 
and the parole officer's duty to in-
dependently review that in an order 
to show cause hearing and, therefore, 
the court feels that a parole officer 
has the right and obligation himself 
to gather evidence for that order to 
show cause hearing. 
The court is persuaded that if there 
were evidence that this was not the 
good faith effort on the part of the 
parole officer to see if there had 
been a parole violation or a commission 
of a crime, which is a paroie violation, 
but rather he was being used as a tool 
of the police rathen than them obtain-
ing what they would have to obtain a 
search warrant, the court feels the 
motion would be well taken. However, 
the court has found no evidence of 
that in this record and, in fact, 
would refer to.the case [State v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983)] 
cited by counsel for the defendant 
wherein the court feels the facts in 
that case were a much worse scenario. 
The court cites from page 1257 where it 
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states "Voyles told Holm that although 
the police did not have probable cause 
for a warrant to search Garcia1s apart-
ment, it would be 'beneficial* to the 
police if the parole department: would 
conduct the search." It seems to me 
that that is a much clearer case that 
the police were using the parole depart-
ment as their agents and yet our supreme 
court nevertheless upheld the search in 
that case (R.239-240). 
The appellant contends that the court erred in making this 
ruling. The court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress 
illegally obtained evidence abridged the appellant's Due Process 
privacy protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
As indicated in the trial court's ruling, the Utah law 
which articulates the standard for determining the propriety of 
parole searches is State v. Velasquz, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). 
Quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 99 S.Ct. 
2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484, 494 (1972) in Velasquez this court 
found: 
In formulating a rule to govern parole 
officer searches, consideration must 
1 
As a threshold inquiry it should be noted that State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) (holding that a specific objection 
at trial is necessacy to preserve a claim of error where a pretrial 
motion to suppress has been denied) does not apply in this case. As 
the majority noted, their holding is specifically limited to those 
situations where a defendant does not provide the appellate court 
with the record of the pretrial hearing so rhat it can review the 
pretrial decision. Id., at 82-83. Lesley is also distinguishable 
from the present case in that Patrick Johnson's trial did not in-
volve tne Lesley problem where one district court judge heard the 
suppression motion and another judge heard the trial. 
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be accorded both to "the government 
function involved" and to "the private 
interest that has been affected by 
governmental action." 
State v. Velasquez, supra at 1259. 
The court stated that the "governmental function involved" 
is: 
. . . to assist those who have broken 
the criminal law to make a controlled 
and supervised transition from prison 
life—with its intimate and constant 
association with a society of law-
breakers and a high degree of regimen-
tation—to a complete reintegration 
into society without that kind of 
association and regimentation. To 
facilitate that transition, an inmate 
is permitted parole status subject 
to conditions designed to maximize 
the potential for a successful rein-
tegration of the parolee by attempt-
ing to ward off some of the undesir-
able influences that may defeat the 
purpose of the parole system. 
Id. at 1258. 
The parolee fs ''private interest" which is to be balanced 
against the State's "governmental function" was found to be: 
". . . a more narrowly protected privacy interest [than the non-
criminal citizen's] designed to facilitate [the parolee's] moving 
more quickly from the confinement of prison to a point where his 
full panoply of civil liberties is restored." E^d. at 1259. 
The court concluded that: 
In dealing with searches of parolee's, 
we agree with those courts that have 
adopted what has been called a "middle 
ground" approach. In determining what 
constitutes permissible searches and 
seizures by parole officers, this 
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approach, on the one hand, eschews the 
position than no constitutional protec-
tion should be afforded a parolee, but, 
on the other hand, does not require a 
warrant based on probable cause. [Cita-
tion ommitted.] Thus, although a warrant 
based on probable cause is not generally 
required, a parole officer must have 
reasonable grounds for investigating 
whether a parolee has violated the terms 
of his parole or committed a crime. 
[Citations ommitted.] 
Id. at 1260. 
The court further concluded that the "reasonable grounds" 
standard constituted a two-part test of a parole search's validity: 
11
. . .it means a reasonable suspicion that a parolee has committed 
a parole violation or crime. [Citations ommitted.] The search, 
however, must also be reasonably related to the parole officerfs 
duty." [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 1260. 
Applying this two-part test—involving judicial scrutiny 
of (1) a parole officer's "reasonable suspicion" that a parole 
violation has occurred, and (2) the reasonable relationship 
between the parole search and the duties of a parole officer—to 
the facts before them, the court in Velasquez denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress. The defendant in Velasquez argued that 
because a defective called the parole officer who searched the 
defendant's residence and told him "it would be 'beneficial' to 
the police if Adult Probation and Parole" would conduct the search, 
the probation officer was simply acting as a tool of the police. 
Velasquez, supra, at 1262. Stating that: 
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A parole officer's search of a parolee 
• . . is not unlawful just because it 
is also benefficial to the police, or 
because evidence incriminating the 
parolee is turned over to the police 
and used in a criminal prosecution. 
Id. at 1263, the court rejected the defendantfs contention 
because "the parole officers had decided that a search should 
be undertaken even before Detective Voyles [the police officer] 
talked to Dennis Holm [one of the parole officers] . " Id., at 
1263. (Emphasis added.) 
Because the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Velasquez 
turns upon the fact that the parole search in that case was not 
instigated by the police, the trial court in the present case 
seriously skewed the language it quoted from Velasquez (see p.10-11 
supra) when it quoted that language out of context. Since the 
court below relied heavily upon this misreading and because there 
does exist evidence in the record that John Shepard acted as a 
tool for the police, the court committed serious error when it 
denied appellantfs motion to suppress. 
The court below concluded that the facts of Velasquez 
present a "much worse scenario," i.e., a much clearer indication 
of a parole officer being used as a tool of the police, than do 
the facts of State v. Patrick Johnson (R.240). The court based 
this conclusion on the fact that a police officer in Velasquez 
asked a parole officer to conduct a search for the benefit of 
police, while no such request exists in the record of the apel-
lant!s trial (R.240). The appellant contends, however, that the 
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trial court's emphasis of the importance of this distinction led it 
to entirely overlook the critical basis for the holding in Velasquez: 
had there been no evidence that the parole officers in that case 
intended to search before being asked to by the police, and if the 
officers had in fact searched without that autonomous, prior 
intent, the court would have found the search illegal. 
The record in the present case indicates that John 
Shepard and Rick Acevedo had sufficient "reasonable suspicion" 
for conducting a parole search other than their concern that trie 
appellant had burglarized a church and forged checks (R.198). 
However, their principal independent concerns—that the appellant 
had pawned a stereo and may have been using drugs—had not led 
them to conduct a search during the month between the report of 
the pawning and the day Detective Jones met with them (R.196). 
The record indicates that it was only after Detective Jones met 
with the parole agents that the agents decided to conduct the 
search (R.200-201). Furthermore, at the time of the search, John 
Shepard explicity stated to Mrs. Morashita that he was searching 
for stolen checks, and once the checks had been found Agent 
Shepard immediately turned the seized evidence over to the 
police and terminated his search (R.187-189). These facts, 
indicating improper complicity between parole agents and police, 
should have led the trial court, relying on Velasquez, to con-
clude that the appellant's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. 
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The appellant does not argue with the contention that: 
The mere fact that [a] police officer was 
the first to suspect that [the parolee] 
was engaged in criminal activity and 
related this to the parole officer—in 
no way alters the legality of the parole 
officerfs presence [i.e., search]. 
Velasquez, supra at 1263, nor with the proposition that ". . .to 
minimize the social risks inherent in parole, an acceptable parole 
system does necessarily entail a certain degree of close super-
vision, surveilllance, and control over the parolee." State v. 
Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. App. 1973). Further, the appellant 
readily admits: 
To evaluate the parolee's progress, and 
to assist the parolee from avoiding 
further criminal conduct, the parole 
officer needs to "have a thorough under-
standing of the parolee and his environ-
ment, including his personal habits, his 
relationships with other person, and 
what he is doing both at home and out-
side it." 
Velasquez, supra, at 1259. However, a trial court cannot ignore 
the dictates of due process which require: ". . .[that] under 
no circumstances should cooperation between law enforcement 
officers and proba-cion officers be permitted to make the probation 
system, a subterfuge for criminal investigations." United States 
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975), and: 
". . . [that] searches conducted . . . by a parole officer can be 
justified only 'to the extent actually necessitated by the legiti-
mate demands of the operation of the parole process." Velasquez, 
supra, at 1263, quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Ala. 1977). 
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As the court in Roman v. State, supra, at 24 2 points out: 
It is only the dual mandate of 
correctional officers to rehabilitate 
their clients and to protect society 
that justifies an intrusion into the 
privacy of the released offender. 
Based on the facts adduced in the trial below, the 
appellant contends that the prosecutorial parole search conducted 
by Agent Shepard furthered neither the rehabilitation of his 
client nor the legitimate protection of society. Agent Shepard 
went into the residence announcing his intent to search for 
stolen checks, found the stolen checks and turned them over to 
the police. Such action can hardly be deemed rehabilitation. 
Furthermore, the police had the duty to perform a warranted search 
once they had probable cause to arrest the appellant. Clearly, 
the police officers in this case could not have searched the 
appellant's premises without a search warrant: as the court below 
recognized (R.240), this case did not involve an exception to the 
rule that "searches conducted [by police] outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.11 Katz y. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 535 
(1967).^ This case should be remanded because John Shepardfs 
2 
As this Court noted in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 
(Utah 1983) , exceptions to the warrantless search rule include 
consent searches, searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, searcnes 
and seizures of contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public, 
seizure of evidence in plain view after lawful intrusion, and 
searches and seizures incident to lawful arrest based on probable 
cause under exigent circumstances. The present case does not 
involve any of these "jealously drawn" exceptions. 
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conduct amounted to circumvention of the requirement that police 
act pursuant to a warrant. This is especially true given that 
the court in Velasquez, supra at 1260 noted: 
We do not address the problem of 
whether a warrant must be obtained 
when a parolee is living with others 
who are not parolees. Caution would 
certainly suggest that a warrant be 
obtained if the rights of non-
parolees might be affected. 
In Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1969), it was 
held that a parole officer may not constitutionally conduct a 
warrantless search of items in a parolee's possession while act-
ing on the prior request of law enforcement officials and in 
concert with them. In Rhay, upon being informed by the sheriff 
that a burglary had occurred in the shop in which the parolee's 
wife worked, the parole officer accompanied a deputy sheriff to 
find the parolee. The parolee was apprehended in a restaurant 
and the trio went to the parolee's hotel room, where in plain 
sight the officers saw a major portion of the items taken from 
the shop. The parolee was convicted of burglary and sought habeas 
corpus relief, which was denied by the Federal District Court, 
and the parolee appealed. Finding that the parole officer was 
acting as an agent of the police, and deciding that the items 
had been unconstitutionally seized and should not have been 
admitted into evidence, the court reversed. The court said that 
where the parole officer was acting on the prior request of law 
enforcement officials and in concert with them, he was not acting 
as the supervising guardian, so to speak, of the parolee, but 
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as the agent of the very authority upon whom the requirement for 
a search warrant is constitutionally imposed, and that to permit 
concerted effort among officials in an attempt, such as was 
manifest in the present case, to circumvent the parolee's 
Fourth Amendment rights could not be done. 
The appellant in the present case contends that, just 
as in Rhay, his parole officer and the police acted in concert 
to circumvent the requirement that the police obtain a warrant 
to search a parolee's residence. While the record below does 
not explicitly indicate that the police requested Agent Shepard 
to conduct a search, the manner in which the search was arranged 
and conducted readily gives rise to the inference that such a 
request was made. But even if no request was made, the appellant 
would urge this court to send a message to overly compliant, even 
if well-meaning, parole officers that they must stay out of the 
business of conducting searches in order to supply the police with 
evidence of crimes. Because the appellant's parole officer was 
not acting within his prescribed "supervisory" role when he 
searched the appellant's residence, the court below should have 
excluded the evidence obtained during the search. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE. 
This appeal is from the conviction of burglary of the 
Four Square Church and forgery of a Four Square Church check. 
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to sever the one count 
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of forgery (and one count of burglary) involving the Four Square 
Church checking account from the seven counts of forgery involving 
the checking account of Cary Montoya (R.10) (Addendum A). The 
trial court granted this motion (R.10) (Addendum B). One day 
before trial began, defense counsel made a motion, under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), to exclude from 
trial the proposed testimony of Nora Welch (see p. 4 supra)(R.25). 
Ms- Welch's proffer was that the appellant presented himself as 
Cary Montoya and cashed a check on the account of Cary Montoya 
in a local supermarket on February 2, 1985 (the same day that the 
appellant allegedly cashed the Four Square Church check using the 
name Cary or Gary Montoya). The trial court denied the appellant's 
motion to exclude this testimony, ruling that it fell within the 
"identity" exception to Rule 404(b) (R.164). In so ruling the 
court committed reversible error. 
Nora Welch's testimony plainly constitutes other crimes 
evidence within the context of the Four Square Church trial. The 
appellant contends that the court's admission of this other crimes 
evidence was seriously prejudicial since the evidence was not 
probative of a material issue, but was merely cumulative. Further-
more, by allowing the evidence into trial the court effectively 
nullified its ruling granting the appellant's requested severance 
of the forgery counts. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) states: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a 
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person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, pre-
paration, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. 
Interpreting Rule 404(b)fs predecessor, Rule 55, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) , this Court, in State v. Cauble, 563 
P.2d 775, 779 (Utah 1977), held: 
The general rule is that in a criminal 
case evidence which shows or tends to 
show that the defendant had committed 
another crime in addition to that for 
which he is on trial is inadmissible. 
However, an exception to the rule is 
that evidence of another crime is ad-
missible when it tends to establish 
motive; intent:; absence of mistake or 
accident; or to show a common scheme 
or plan embracing commission of similar 
crimes so related to each other that 
the proof of one tends to establish the 
crime for which the defendant is on trial. 
In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah 1982) this 
Court narrowly confined the admissibility of "common scheme" 
other crimes evidence: 
Evidence is not admitted merely be-
cause it shows a common plan, scheme, 
or manner of operation. Instead, 
evidence of a common plan, scheme, 
or manner of operation is admitted 
where it tends to prove some fact 
material to the crime charged. 
In his concurrence to the Forsyth opinion, Justice 
Stewart articulated the spirit in which the court should evaluate 
other crimes evidence: 
The rule excluding evidence of prior 
misconduct to show the character or 
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disposition of a defendant was 
established not because such evi-
dence was irrelevant, but because 
of the likelihood that it would 
skew the fact-finding process . . . 
Referring to the federal counter-
part to Rule 55, 10 Moore Federal 
Practice, §404.-21[2] (2nd. Ed. 
1981) states: "Admission of other 
crimes evidence is not guaranteed 
under Rule 404 (b) even if it is 
offered for !other purposes. . .f. 
The danger of undue prejudice must 
be balanced against the probative 
value of the evidence in making 
this determination." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Id. at 1178. 
Most recently, in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), 
this Court applied the Forsyth "identity" standard and utilized 
Justice Stewart's proposed balancing approach to find that 
evidence indicating the defendant committed a robbery while in 
possession of a stolen car would not be admissible on the issue 
of whether in fact the defendant did have possession of the 
car since the issue of identity of the car thief was foreclosed 
by other competent evidence. Admission of the robbery evidence 
would have been merely cumulative and therefore unduly prejudicial. 
The appellant contends that the Holder test of admissibil-
ity readily applies in the present case to indicate that the 
testimony of Nora Welch should have been excluded from the trial 
below. Because State's witness Lynn Cevering (see p.3 supra) 
was able to say he was "70 percent" certain that the appellant 
was the individual who had cashed the Four Square Church check, 
the effect of Nora Welch's testimony was merely cumulate rather 
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than probative on the issue of identity. If Mr. Cevering had not 
been able to identify the appellant with any degree of certainty 
then Ms. Welch!s testimony would possibly have been admissible: 
her testimony increased in probative value in proportion to Mr. 
Ceveringfs uncertainty. But because Mr. Ceveringfs testimony 
was substantially probative on the issue of identity, the 
State's case, as in the Holder case, could not be furthered in 
this essentially "foreclosed" issue by the dangerously prejudicial 
other crimes testimony of Ms. Welch. Applying the balancing 
test urged by Justice Stewart, the danger of undue prejudice 
in this case outweighed the probative value of the Statefs other 
crimes evidence. Because the probative value of Ms. Welch's 
testimony was far outweighed by its threat of prejudice, the jury 
below was permitted to consider statements indicating no-ching 
other than the appellant's propensity to commit crime. 
Even if Ms. Welch's testimony was more probative than 
prejudicial, still her testimony should have been excluded by 
virtue of the court's severance of the forgery counts. Presum-
ably, at the time the trial court granted the appellant's motion 
to sever the various counts of forgery arising from two separate 
criminal episodes, it did so because one trial on all offenses 
would have denied the appellant due process of law. This is 
especially true given that the court below found the methods of 
forging the Four Square Church and Cary Montoya checks were so 
similar as to constitute a "common scheme11 (R.164) . A decision 
to sever counts on an information where those counts evidence 
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a "common scheme" is not one made lightly by Utah trial judges. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court will overturn a trial 
judgefs failure to sever only upon a substantial showing of 
prejudicial harm. State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 
1984) . 
The policies furthered by granting severance of counts 
are nearly identical to those advanced when the court excludes 
other crimes evidence. Recognizing judicial economy as the 
advantage of joinder of offenses, the Distridt of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 
1964) noted four disadvantages of joinder: (1) the defendant 
could become embarrassed or have difficulty in presenting defenses; 
(2) the jury may infer a criminal disposition and thereby prejudice 
the defendant; (3) the jury may view the evidence cumulatively; 
and (4) a prejudicial latent feeling of Hostility may surface. 
Given these reasons for severing counts in an information, it is 
the appellant's contention -chat severance is useless if evidence 
specifically pertaining to separate and severed criminal acts 
will be mutually admissible in tne separate trials. The due 
process rights the court protects with one hand it eradicates 
with the other. Therefore, the court below committed a prejudicial 
about-face by inconsistently ruling that severance would be 
granted while the 404(b) motion would be denied. For this reason 
and because Ms. Welch's testimony constituted cumulative, sub-
stantially prejudicial other crimes evidence, the appellant 
should be granted a new trial. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE 
JURY AN INSTRUCTION WHICH CONTAINED 
A MANDATORY REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
on the last day of trial, defense counsel took exception 
to the court's proposed "possession of property recently stolen" 
instruction (T.124). Despite this objection the court included 
in its jury instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
A related statute provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession is made, shall be prima 
facie evidence that the person in posses-
sion stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (I) that a 
defendant was in possession of property, 
(II) that the property was stolen in a 
burglary, (III) that such possession was 
not too remote in point of time from the 
burglary, and (IV) that a defendant had 
made no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, then you may find from those 
facts that such defendant committed the 
burglary in which such property was stolen, 
and stole the property. 
The appellant contends that the lower court committed 
reversible error by giving the above instruction because it 
unconstitutionally relieved the State of its burden of proof 
and improperly shifted a burden of proving innocence onto the 
defendant. 
This Court's recent holdings in State v. Chambers, 709 
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Pacheco, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
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(Utah 1985) are dispositive of the present case and should lead 
this Court to grant the appellant a new trial. 
In Chambers/ this Court stated: 
In this case the trial court instructed 
the jury that possession of recently 
stolen property, in the absence of a 
satisfactory explanation, is "prima 
facie11 evidence of theft by the person 
in possession of the property. Such 
an instruction. . . fits within the 
Franklin definition of a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption: "A "[manda-
tory] rebuttable presumption. . . 
requires the jury to find the element 
unless the defendant persuades the 
jury that such a finding is unwarrant-
ed." 105 S.Ct. at 1971, n.2. 
We therefore hold that the instruction 
given in this case was unconstitutional. 
State v. Chambers, supra at 16 (followed in Stare v. Pacheco, 
supra at 19). 
In so ruling, this Court implicity found that giving the 
instruction in question resulted in circumvention of the rule, 
established in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 25 L.Ed. 2d 368, 
374, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074 (1970), that the due process clause 
requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime. . . charged." The rationale underlying 
the Chambers ruling was also partly gleaned from this Court's 
reading of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 61 L.Ed. 2d 39, 
99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979), (where the Court ruled on the constitution-
ality of an instruction which read: "[T]he law presumes that 
a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his 
own acts."): 
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In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the jury could have 
interpreted the presumption as 
irrebuttable or alternatively as 
requiring a high level of proof in 
order to rebut the presumption, 
thereby "effecitvely shifting -die 
burden of persuasion, . . ". 
State v. Chambers, supra at 16. 
The Chambers ruling relied most directly upon the recent 
United States Supreme Court case of Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 
1965,85 L.Ed. 2d 344 (1985): 
Franklin extended the Sandstrom 
decision and found that use of any 
mandatory rebuttable presumption in 
a jury instruction is unconstitutional. 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption 
. . . relieves the State of the 
affirmative burden of persuasion on 
the presumed element by instructing 
the jury that it must find the pre-
sumed element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury not to make such 
a finding. A mandatory rebuttable 
assumption is perhaps less onerous 
[than an irrebuttable or conclusive 
presumption] from the defendant's 
perspective, but is no less un-
constitutional . 
Chambers, supra at 16 quoting Franklin, supra at 1972-1973. 
The appellant in the present case contends that a manda-
tory rebuttable presumption arose when the trial court read 
instruction 13 quoted above. Because this case involves an 
instruction identical to the one found objectionable in Chambers, 
this Court should grant the appellant a new trial. 
It should be noted that the language in instruction 13 
which follows the quotation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) does 
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not cure the defect which arose from reading the statute. As 
this Court stated in Chambers, supra, at 16-17: 
Although there was another instruction 
given, instruction No. 25, which re-
stated the presumption in permissive* 
form, the additional instruction 
failed to cure the defect. "Language 
that merely contradicts and does not 
explain a constitutionally infirm 
instruction will not suffice to 
absolve the infirmity. A reviewing 
court has no way of knowing which of 
the two irreconcilable instructions 
the jurors applied in reaching their 
verdict." (Citation omitted.) Thus, 
because the mandatory presumption in 
question directly related to the 
determination of defendant's guilt, 
we hold that defendants are entitled 
to a new trial. 
It should also be noted that the non-statutory language 
in instruction 13 informs the jury that the appellant could be 
presumed guilty where the "defendant had made no satisfactory 
explanation" of his possession of stolen property. This language 
suffers from the very infirmity which lies at the heart of the 
objectionable stautory language. The appellant should be granted 
a new trial because "[a]n instruction which could reasonably be 
understood to relieve the State of its burden of proof is consti-
tutionally defective." Chambers, supra at 17. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below erred in failing to grant the defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during the improper parole 
search of the defendant's residence. The court committed further 
serious error when it ruled that merely cumulative, other crimes 
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evidence pertaining to forgery counts severed from the trial 
below could be admitted at trial. Eclipsing the prejudice 
caused by these two rulings, the court committed fundamental 
error when it insisted upon reading the jury an unconstitutional 
"possession of property recently stolen" instruction. Because 
of the highly prejudicial nature of the errors committed below, 
the appellant requests that his conviction be reversed and that 
his case be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1986. 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Frances M. Palacios, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellant!s Brief will be deliverd to the Attorney 
Generalfs Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this day of of January, 1986. 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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KAREN JENNINGS (-?1660) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East S^\
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (L^U^a.^ ^\C^^ 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff : 
-v- : 
PATRICK JOHNSON, : Case No . ( Q R 8 5 ^ 2 ^ 
Defendant : 
The defendant through his counsel, KAREN JENNINGS, hereby 
moves to suppress at trial items taken from the house in which 
he was arrested on February 1&, 1985 because: 
1. They were seized in violation of his 
right against unreasonable searches 
and seizure. 
2. Counsel for the defendant was notified 
of the existence of such items on Mav 
6, 1985 and has tried without success 
to get copies of said items for invest-
igation nurposes. The County Attorney 
was on May 6th, aware that counsel for 
the defendant had a vacation scheduled 
for Hay 9-17, 1985 and still has failed 
and refused to make copies of said 
items. A Discovery Order was signed 
by this court on April 26, 1985. 
2*1 DATED this Q^ day of Fay, 1985 
Respectfully submitted, 
KAREN JENNINGS ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#25 02) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
MAY l l 1985 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
PATRICK D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
Case N tfs^CR 85-388.-and 
^—Or-8-5^89 
(Judge Billings) 
The defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, by and through his 
attorney, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, hereby moves this Court in the 
above-entitled action to exclude all evidence of crimes, wrongs, 
or acts pursuant to 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
DATED this c^f day of May, 1985. 
o 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to the Jimmy Gurule, 
Deputy County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this Z-l day of May, 1985. 
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FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
^ctit LOKC County, Ulni 
JUL 17 1985 
Cier\ ore ^«st Court 
P^~ .tV HPfk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
PATRICK D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND MOTION FOR STAY OF FURTHER 
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE PENDING 
APPEAL 
Case No. CR 85-388 
(Judge Billings) 
Defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, by and through his attorney 
of record, hereby applies for a Certificate of Probable Cause 
pursuant to Section 77-35-27, Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Defendant bases this Application for Probable Cause 
on the following meritorious issues arising from his trial and 
subsequent conviction in case number CR 85-388. 
1. The trial court should have granted defendant's 
motion to suppress on the grounds that the search was not 
within the delineated purpose and policy of a parole search. 
2. The trial court should have granted defendant's 
motion to exclude the alleged specific bad act of defendant 
pursuant to Rule 404b, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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T. L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JIMMY GURULE1 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
ST 4 
Oleu ^ ^r-^awoclai^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
PATRICK D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. CR 85-388 
Honorable Judith Billings 
On May 23, 1985, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence found 
at the defendant's residence as the result of a parole search came before the 
Court for hearing, the Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding. The State of 
Utah was represented by Jimmy Gurule1 , Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant 
was represented by Counsel, Frances Palacios. Testimony was given and oral 
arguments were heard by the Court. Being fully advised of the legal questions 
at issue; having considered the proposed evidence; authorities of counsel and 
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
(1) John Shepherd, an Agent with Utah State Adult Probation and Parole, 
testified that on February 2, 1985, the defendant, PATRICK D. JOHNSON, was on 
parole for the commission of a burglary, a third-degree felony. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CR 85-388 
Page 2 
(2) John Shepherd further testififed that on February 2, 1985, he spoke 
with Detective Kyle Jones, Salt Lake City Police Department, who stated that a 
formal information had been filed with the Court charging the defendant with 
eight felony counts of Forgery. 
(3) Detective Jones stated that one of the forged checks was taken during 
a burglary of the Four Square Church. The other forged checks were made out on 
the checking account of "Cary Montoya". 
(4) On February 2, 1985, John Shepherd accompanied Detective Jones to 
the defendant's residence for the purpose of conducting a parole search in an 
attempt to locate property and/or checks taken during the Four Square Church 
burglary as well as other checks belonging to Cary Montoya. 
(5) During the search of the defendant's residence Agent John Shepherd 
located a blank check on the account of Four Square Church and numerous papers 
and receipts containing the name and/or signature of "Cary Montoya11 • 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) That pursuant to Rule 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
the Four Square Church check and the papers and receipts containing the name 
and/or signature of Cary Montoya are probative on the issue of the identity of 
the perpetrator of the burglary and the forgeries charged in the instant case. 
(2) As set forth in State v Velasquez, P2d (Utah 1983), Agent John 
Shepherd had "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a parole search of the defendant's 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CR 85-388 
Page 3 
residence. Agent Shepherd had "reasonable suspicion" to believe the defendant 
had camiitted a parole violation or other crime and further that contraband 
would be located in his residence. The search was therefore reasonable and not 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or 
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution. 
The Court having entered its Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters 
its: 
ORDER 
The DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IS DENIED. 
Li C*°**~ DATED this 4 day of AUGUST, 1985. 
•4* J?-
i tfTBILLIN /JcpITH tf7 BILLINGS 
Third D i s t r i c t Court Jui 
Approved as to form: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H»«OLr.Y 
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